THE REGION OF ARCTIC: A THEATRE OF INFLUENCES AND OPPORTUNITIES
BLUF:
Ø The Arctic allows for the combination of deterrence, control of energies and economic flows and normative assertiveness within a single space. It therefore offers a definite advantage to the powers capable of operating there.
Ø Russia’s (RUS) approach is neither expansionist in the traditional sense nor purely defensive. Moscow does not seek to exclude other actors entirely, but rather to make them dependent on its rules.
Ø The United States (USA) is relying on cooperation to make the Arctic a space of collective surveillance, logistics, and indirect deterrence.
Ø Greenland's growing role in the US political and defence strategy highlights a contradiction: the need for a stronger presence clashes with local and political sensitivities.
Ø The region puts NATO in an uncomfortable position: strengthening its presence is necessary for deterrence, but any over-militarization risks transforming this historically cooperative space into an area of permanent confrontation.
CONTEXT
Long perceived as a frozen periphery of the international system, the Arctic has thus become a strategic area where economic, energy-related and geopolitical interests are intertwined. The accelerated melting of the ice has opened up economic opportunities as new shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), considerably reducing shipping times between Asia and Europe (cf. Figure 1).
In this context, RUS occupies a unique position: it owns more than half of the Arctic coastline, concentrates part of its military infrastructure in the Far North, and is heavily dependent on Arctic resources for its national economy.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the region is no longer an area of consensual cooperation. Multilateral mechanisms, in particular the Arctic Council[1], are operating at a slower pace, while strategic mistrust between power states has increased. Moscow is integrating the Arctic into a broader vision of confrontation with the West, perceiving the region as a defensive bastion and a tool for projecting power. At the same time, USA and its allies are rediscovering the importance of the northern flank.
[1] The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum comprising the eight Arctic states (USA, Canada, RUS, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Finland) which focuses on sustainable development and environmental protection. It facilitates dialogue, research and cooperation, but does not have the power to enforce its decisions.RUSSIAN STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC
RUS’ Arctic activities are based on three closely linked pillars: militarization, control of economic flows, and exploitation of natural resources. Dimensions that all contribute to make the Arctic an area of quasi-exclusive sovereignty. Militarization and capabilities RUS has transformed the region into a strategic military stronghold. According to recent estimates[1], it has deployed more than 100,000 military personnel in the region, spread across 32 bases (cf. Figure 2).
[1] The Simon Foundation Canada AND Author Unknown, “Arctic Geopolitics in 2025: A Comparative Analysis of Military Strategies, Capabilities, Sovereignty Claims Among Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden”, March 2025, Debugliesnews It is concentrating its most advanced capabilities on the Arctic coast, including S-400 Triumf systems (range of 400 km) and Bastion coastal systems (Oniks missiles with a range of 600 km), to create an access denial network.
Control of the Northern Sea Route
As the Northwest Passage, RUS considers the NSR to be an internal waterway over which it claims sovereign control (cf. Figure 1). It therefore imposes escort requirements and fees on commercial vessels, which can total several million dollars per transshipment. RUS is asserting itself as the dominant regional power.
According to the report “Overview of Transit Voyages along the Northern Sea Route”, published by the Centre for Northern Logistics (CHNL) in August 2025, 52 transits were recorded on the NSR by, with an estimated total of 1.3 million tons of goods transported. This is an increase on the same period last year, when 45 transits were recorded (cf. Figures 3 & 4). The CHNL pointed out that the main flow was eastbound shipments from RUS to China (CHN), accounting for 97% of cargoes. The report also indicates that crude oil accounts for around 54% of the total volume transported. Despite sanctions being imposed, CHN remains one of its main buyers of Russian oil.
The Leningrad Military District (LMD) is one of RUS' five main military districts. These districts serve as regional command structures responsible for force management, training, logistics and operations. Following the absorption of the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in 2024, Arctic units, including coastal defence brigades, Northern Fleet naval forces and Arctic aviation detachments, were integrated under the command of the LMD.
The July Storm 2025 exercise was a major Russian joint military exercise that tested the integrated operations of the navy, air force, army, and strategic missile units.
Moreover, according to the Artic Year Book and High North News, in 2025, Atomflot[5] conducted 976 icebreaker escort operations along the NSR, generating an estimated $50-70 million in revenue. RUS has effectively transformed Arctic icebreaking from a sovereign enabler into a source of state revenue. By charging access fees ranging from $300,000 to $700,000 per transit, Moscow reinforces its long-term ambition to establish the NSR as a completely Russian-governed maritime economical corridor rather than an international passage.
In October 2025, the second meeting of the Subcommittee on Cooperation on the Northern Sea Route of the Russian-Chinese Commission for Preparing Regular Meetings of Heads of Government was hosted in Harbin (CHN). Alexey LIKACHEV[6], Director General of the Rosatom State Corporation[7], chaired the meeting on the Russian side, and Liu WEI, Minister of Transport of the People's Republic of China, chaired the meeting on the Chinese side. Vladimir PANOV, Special Representative of the Rosatom State Corporation for Arctic Development, also attended the meeting.
Following it, an action plan was approved to develop transportation along the NSR between the two countries. The development and approval of the roadmap aim to create a sustainable transport corridor. This involves introducing modern logistics and technological solutions to improve transportation efficiency and develop capital projects. The meeting strengthened Sino-Russian access to the Arctic.
[5] Atomflot is a Russian state company that operates the country’s fleet of nuclear icebreakers, providing year-round escort services for cargo and LNG ships along the NSR. It also supports Arctic research, logistics, and strategic maritime operations, enabling Russia to maintain permanent navigation in the High North.[6] Alexey LIKACHEV is also the Director General of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency[7] Rosatom State Corporation is RUS’ state-owned nuclear energy company. It is responsible for civilian nuclear power, nuclear fuel production and nuclear research. It also oversees RUS’s nuclear icebreaker fleet through Atomflot, which links energy and strategic operations in the Arctic. RUS wants to transform the NSR into a transit corridor capable of competing with the Suez Canal while exploiting its energetic reserves. However, these ambitions face structural constraints (incomplete infrastructure, high logistics costs, extreme climatic conditions) and growing dependence on Asia for investment and commercial outlets.
Exploitation of natural resources
The Arctic's energy potential is enormous: according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) of 2008, this region is estimated to contain approximately 90 billion barrels of oil and 1.6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. As reported by Bellona Environmental Transparency Center (cf. Note n°11), it accounts for 11% of Russian exports and 7.5% of GDP, highlighting the direct contribution of resource industries to federal revenue. Moreover, the Russian Arctic already stand for around 20% of the country's future hydrocarbon production[1].
Russian state and quasi-state corporations understood the importance of Arctic resource extraction, generating substantial economic returns that underpin Moscow’s broader geostrategic posture(cf. Figure 5). Rosneft and Gazprom together account for a significant proportion of RUS’ hydrocarbon production. Rosneft produces over 3.3 million barrels of oil per day (~31% of national output), while Gazprom controls dozens of licences for the Arctic shelf with vast oil and gas reserves[2]. Once fully developed, projects such as Vostok Oil are expected to reach annual capacities of up to 100 million tons of crude, which will be channeled through NSR infrastructure[3] . Project Yamal LNG produces 16.5 million tons of LNG per year and aims to reach 20 million tons by 2026.
According to the website Zone Bourse, Norilsk Nickel, a leading Arctic miner, posted revenue of ~456 billion roubles ($5-6 billion) in the first half of 2025, reflecting the importance of resource extraction to RUS’ export base.
Revenues and future tax income from Arctic development are projected to exceed $160 billion by 2035 and illustrate the long-term economic stakes involved[4].
These companies finance major infrastructure and military logistics. They are the instruments of RUS economic leverage in the global energy and minerals markets.
[1] Colonel (COL) Robert A. McVey, Jr - Russian Strategic Interest in Arctic Heats Up as Ice Melts, September 2022[2] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Russia energy overview report, July 2025 [3] Bellona Environmental Transparency Center, Monthly Highlights from the Russian Arctic - May 2025, July 2025[4] High North News, Russia to Earn $160bn in Taxes From Northern Sea Route by 2035, Arctic Region Accounts for 7.5 Percent of GDP, May 2025Isolated from European markets, RUS turned again to Asia, viewing the Arctic routes as a strategic bypass to connect resources with the Chinese market. India, Vietnam, South Korea and Japan are also being approached to invest in the region's projects. On August 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei LAVROV announced that RUS was interested in collaborating with India on energy projects, including hydrocarbon extraction. Nevertheless, not all investments are successful. Japanese companies have played a significant part in energy projects related to the Arctic, such as the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in RUS Far East. However, these investments have largely been frozen due to geopolitical risks and sanctions, illustrating the current caution regarding investments in this region. Moscow is thus seeking to turn the Arctic into a new area of Eurasian cooperation, focusing on economic and energy opportunities. This will reinforce RUS' foothold in the Asian continent, while consolidating its influence.
USA, ITS ALLIES AND THE ISSUE OF GREENLAND
Faced with Russian strategic influence in the Arctic, Washington has declared the region a priority for its security, notably through its Arctic Strategy for 2024, which emphasizes infrastructure modernization and defense of North America's northern flank.
Because it controls a part of the Northwest passage, USA has continued to update its approach to the region through multiple strategic policy instruments, as the Implementation Plan 2025-2026 for the Arctic Research Plan 2022-2026, collectively forming an updated Arctic strategy with an explicit emphasis on security and defense.
USA maintains a military presence in the Arctic, centred on around ten sites[1] that are operated continuously, primarily in Alaska and Greenland. These installations support a broader US Arctic defense posture, with over 22,000 active-duty troops in Alaska and additional Coast Guard personnel contributing to patrols and logistics. This approach reflects a cooperative defense strategy within the framework of NORAD[2], prioritizing interoperability and surveillance over heavy permanent deployments.
Moreover, USA military fleet capabilities, in the Arctic, remain limited. The US fleet of 12 heavy icebreakers (including 3 operational polar icebreakers) lags far behind 54 Russian icebreakers (8 of which are nuclear-powered) (cf. Figure 6).
To compensate, the Pentagon also supports multilateral initiatives, such as the ICE Pact (USA, Canada, Finland), which aim to develop icebreaker construction to challenge RUS' advantage in this area. NORAD exemplifies USA's reliance on close collaboration to detect threats and coordinate rapid responses in this region. USA’s Arctic security depends as much on collective defense as on national capabilities.
The Bering Strait: a US-Russian challenge
The Bering Strait is a major strategic flashpoint between USA and RUS. It separates Alaska from Chukotka by just 85 kms, with less than 4 kms between the Diomede Islands (one American and one Russian) (cf. Figure 7). This geographical proximity places two nuclear powers face to face and makes the strait an area of constant surveillance.
In addition, Arctic warming, which is four times faster than the global average, is making the strait more navigable and increasing its strategic importance. For RUS, it is a key passage connecting the NSR to the Pacific Ocean, essential to its strategy. On the American side, the defense of Alaska and the surveillance of Russian naval movements are motivating the strengthening of military infrastructure, particularly around Nome and in the Aleutian Islands[3]. The area is seeing an intensification of air and naval patrols illustrating a logic of active deterrence. In 2025, the U.S. Coast Guard significantly increased its presence in the Arctic by deploying two icebreakers for extended patrols and by engaging with foreign research vessels near the USA's extended continental shelf. Furthermore, the U.S. Northern Command's Arctic Edge 2025 exercise[4] enhanced joint force preparedness and surveillance integration across air, naval, and land domains within the Arctic theatre.
The Bering Strait thus embodies Arctic’s rivalry where narrow geography, measured militarization, and strategic interdependence limit the risk of direct confrontation while maintaining lasting tension.
EU and Nordic allies
The European Union supports cooperation with USA in the Arctic by funding research and environmental monitoring, as well as infrastructure that reinforces security objectives. Key elements of a collective deterrence posture against the militarization of the High North include intelligence sharing, satellite monitoring and maritime domain awareness. This partnership reflects a dual-track strategy of defense and continued diplomatic engagement to maintain stability in the region. Moreover, in May 2025, UK Foreign Secretary David LAMMY stated that the Arctic had become “an increasingly important frontier for geopolitical competition and trade, and a key area for European and UK security”, emphasizing how Russian and American activities have increased the region's strategic importance.
The Nordic countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark) are playing an increasingly important role. The accession of Finland in April 2023 and Sweden in March 2024 has expanded NATO's coverage area to the Far North, thereby reducing RUS’ strategic space.
Norway, which has units specialized in extreme cold conditions, works closely with USA to monitor and counter Russian activities. Amendment to the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement between Oslo and Washington, entered in to force in 2024, allow American troops access to eight bases[5] in northern Norway for rapid deployment. Military exercises Joint Viking 2025 and Arctic Dolphin 2025 (under NATO leadership), including P-8 Poseidon patrols and naval maneuvers, will enhance situational awareness and undersea surveillance in the Barents and Norwegian Seas. Satellite and radar assets operated by Oslo and shared with Washington provide real-time intelligence on naval and air movements.
USA used also defense cooperation with Denmark: the US- Denmark Defense Agreement (signed in 1951 and renewed and updated multiple times, most recently in 2023) grants USA access to bases in Greenland, including the Pituffik Space Base. With Sweden, USA signed bilateral security cooperation agreements (updated after Sweden applied to join NATO), allowing for deployments, intelligence sharing and joint exercises.
This security cooperation’s approach demonstrates the growing role of Scandinavian countries into the American active deterrence in the Arctic. Nevertheless, USA’s recent political positions could call these various cooperations into question.
Greenland: at the heart of allies’ tensions
Greenland, Denmark's vast autonomous Arctic territory, has become a strategic hub for competition due to its geolocation, between the two main Arctic routes (cf. Figure 1) and its significant reserves of critical minerals, including rare earth elements (1.5 million tons exploitable according to the USGS), as well as lithium, graphite, and other elements essential to green and military technologies (cf. Figure 8). These rare earths include neodymium, dysprosium, ytterbium, and other metals that are essential for permanent magnets, wind turbines, and electric vehicles, which are now at the heart of global technology supply chains.
Operating the Pituffik base (cf. Figure 9) allows USA to increase its surveillance capacity. Nevertheless, the country sees also this deposit as an opportunity to diversify its supply and reduce its dependence on CHN.
In 2025 and beginning of 2026, statements by USA leaders reaffirmed Washington's strategic interest in Greenland, going so far as to mention an increased presence and even greater control. This pressure has been firmly rejected by Denmark and by local opinion, which is largely hostile to any territorial transfer, emphasizing that any decision rests with the Greenlandic people and not with unilateral actions. Moreover, Times Now World, stated that January 11th 2025, British officials are in talks with Germany and France to start deploying military force to Greenland. Without a diplomatic solution, the world's largest island could become the scene of escalating tensions between historic allies
[1] Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (Alaska) – Major USAF and Army hub for Arctic training and air defense. / Eielson Air Force Base (Alaska) – Supports Arctic aviation, fighter rotations, and strategic exercises. / Fort Greely (Alaska) – Missile defense (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) and Arctic contingency operations. / Clear Space Force Station (Alaska) – Radar and early-warning for missile and space surveillance. / Pituffik Space Base (Greenland) – U.S. Space Force / Air Force site for NORAD missile early warning and space tracking. / Thule Air Base Annexes (Greenland) – Logistics, radar, and air defense support facilities. / Coast Guard Base Kodiak (Alaska) – Arctic patrols, icebreaker support, and search-and-rescue operations. / Coast Guard Station Barrow (Alaska) – Northernmost U.S. Arctic station for SAR and sovereignty missions.[2] NORAD is a binational command (USA - Canada) that provides aerospace warning, air sovereignty and maritime monitoring across North America.[3] Nome is a city located on the western coast of Alaska, along the Bering Sea. The Aleutian Islands are a chain of volcanic islands stretching southwest from Alaska towards RUS.[4] A joint military exercise led by the U.S. Northern Command and conducted in Alaska and the surrounding Arctic waters. The exercise focuses on training forces for Arctic conditions and involves integrating Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard units. It also tests surveillance, rapid response and interoperability in extreme cold and ice-covered environments.[5] Andøya Military Air Station and airfield / Bardufoss Military Air Station and airfield / Haakonsvern Naval Station / Namsen Fuel Terminal, Statland / Ørland Military Air Station and airfield / Osmarka cave complex / Setermoen Garrison and firing/training area / Værnes Garrison, military air station and airfieldNATO'S POSITION AND ROLE IN THE REGION
NATO recognizes the Arctic as a strategic front for Euro-Atlantic security. Reports by NATO bodies, including the 2017 Connolly Report on “NATO and Security in the Arctic”, explicitly framed the Arctic importance during the Cold War and to NATO’s nowadays security due to climate change and competitions. The restructuring of NATO's command in December 2025, which saw Nordic countries and Arctic responsibilities placed under the remit of Joint Force Command Norfolk, was an operational affirmation that the High North and the surrounding northern regions were central to Euro-Atlantic defense planning.
The Alliance has therefore stepped-up joint exercises, Arctic Forge 25 and Arctic Light 2025 in order to improve the mobility and interoperability of its forces. It also emphasizes multi-domain surveillance to counter Russian access denial systems (cf. Figure 10).
However, NATO does not yet have a fully integrated Arctic strategy. Some Western officials believe that the Alliance should extend its doctrine beyond the High North to adopt an approach covering the entire Arctic Circle, which would involve more robust commitments and increased investment.
On 26 November 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for stronger cooperation with NATO to contain Russian (and Chinese) strategies in the Arctic, stressing that militarization can undermine regional stability if it is not governed by clear international laws and regulations.
NATO must manage three internal tensions: on one hand, the need to deter RUS without provoking uncontrolled escalation, deter the President Donald TRUMP’s protectionist and isolationist policy in the Arctic and on the other hand, the need to cooperate with regional actors in civilian areas to maintain a stable framework.
OUTLOOK
In the medium term (2026-2035), the Arctic is likely to become a center of sustained strategic competition. RUS, reassessing its geography, infrastructure, and military power, will continue to claim the region, a pillar of its national security policy. Its strategy involves increasing investment in nuclear icebreakers and expanding the NSR to quadruple traffic volumes by 2030. The exploitation of Arctic energy and mineral resources will remain a cornerstone of the approach, from hydrocarbons to the rare earths needed for the energy transition. Moscow intends to make this a major economic lever.
Issue related to Greenland could likely reshuffle the deck of alliances. USA and its allies will seek to strengthen their cooperation and dialogue trying to not turn the Arctic into an area of direct confrontations. However, multilateral initiatives, represent a pragmatic response to Russian capabilities.
Finally, the environmental dimension should not be underestimated: while the retreat of the ice is opening access to the region, it is also increasing the risk of pollution and maritime incidents. Indigenous peoples and Arctic civil infrastructure will be increasingly involved in multilateral debates, adding a socio-political dimension to competition between states.
The Arctic is no longer a strategic backdrop. The future balance will depend on the ability of other actors to develop a coherent strategy combining deterrence, cooperation, and respect for international norms.